The attack cycle is not considered to be a complex process for those operating in the shadows and it applies to all types of attacks. The cycle entails searching for a vulnerable target, conducting intelligence collection and analysis, deploying assets, executing the attack, exploiting the attack's results, and then beginning the cycle anew.

Despite its predictability, applying this knowledge to operations and mitigating terrorist attacks proves to be a challenge. Striking a balance between mission success and threat mitigation is essential. Often, operational personnel perceive intelligence professionals as hindrances to their objectives. The notion that intelligence analysts "might" be wrong, as seen in past instances, often serves as justification to proceed recklessly. It's important to consider that analysts may not always be incorrect, and heeding their advice could disrupt the attack cycle, even if measuring such disruption is challenging.

A prominent example in recent headlines is the evacuation of at-risk personnel from Afghanistan. It's entirely plausible that intelligence personnel forewarned the US government about an impending attack on Hamid Karzai International Airport. Reports even indicate that the Taliban issued warnings of potential attacks prior to the twin bombings that claimed the lives of thirteen US service members and over one hundred and forty civilians.

"We have received reports that malicious elements are planning terror attacks against civilians but are actively doing everything possible to prevent any such attacks from occurring," stated Abdul Qahar Balkhi -Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Consider this scenario: a terrorist organization gains control over an entire nation, aiming to establish an extreme fundamentalist Islamic state, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. With an estimated fifty-five to eighty-five thousand fighters, this organization has a history of genocidal actions. Additionally, numerous Afghan citizens oppose the Taliban's fundamentalist ideology. Many have spent two decades or more resisting this terrorist group, providing intelligence on their activities, collaborating with NATO forces, forming non-profit activist organizations, becoming renowned journalists, establishing media outlets, and courageously pursuing education. These individuals are easily identifiable targets.

Now, envision the perspective of the enemy. They have seized control with international recognition, engaged in peace negotiations with nation-states, and are driven by an unwavering belief in Allah's sanction of violence against those who disagree with their fundamentalist views. Concessions are inconceivable; they answer solely to Allah. Lacking a centralized leadership structure, they find themselves with a concentration of individuals who have betrayed their core belief system, all attempting to escape divine judgment.

From the enemy's standpoint, what's the logical next step? Predicting the attack cycle requires delving into a dark mindset—the enemy's perspective. To anticipate their actions, one must think like them. If one were the enemy, the strategy might involve selecting a high-profile target to maximize casualties, news coverage, terror dissemination, recruitment gains, and the discrediting of opponents. Simultaneously, the enemy would aim to minimize disruption to their own operations, personnel losses, and financial impact.

It's quite plausible that intelligence analysts within the community foresaw this sequence, alerted government leadership at various levels, and were brushed aside. Even someone lacking prior intelligence experience could have predicted the events of August 26, 2021, in Kabul.

The Afghanistan crisis has spiraled into panicked decision-making. Political leadership now appears to be reactive, driven by headlines, rather than proactive in addressing the situation. The catastrophic event is inevitable; regardless of resources poured into the crisis, it will remain a failure.

However, this doesn't imply that government and military leaders can't mitigate future attacks. While the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility for the Kabul attacks, it's plausible that the Taliban possessed advance knowledge or even cooperated with ISKP to bolster their own legitimacy. Both groups share similar beliefs and strategic goals, and neither operates under a centralized structure.

"Movement is life," as famously quoted by Brad Pitt in World War Z, holds true. During humanitarian catastrophes, survival relies on mobility. Concentrating people in one location presents an irresistible target for terrorists. Shifting entry and exit points at Hamid Karzai International Airport could have disrupted the attack cycle. However, the issue military leaders now confront is the panic factor. Despite their efforts, panic has set in, eroding cooperation and trust.

Irrespective of the attack's actual perpetrators, both the Taliban and ISKP are capitalizing on the incident and selecting their next target. Predicting the next move, following the attack cycle and understanding the enemy's mindset, is far from rocket science. The baffling aspect is the incompetence and ignorance exhibited by current leaders, which rendered this crisis entirely avoidable.